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Abstract: The article introduces digital communication by drawing comparisons between 
the histories of digital and conventional written communication. It also shows the technical 
and legal bases and the currently reached achievements. In relation to the technical 
elements, it acquaints the reader with the development and current effects of computer 
technology, especially cryptography. In connection with the legal basis, the work presents 
the regulations which have emerged and made possible the legal acceptance of the digital 
signature and electronic documents in the United States of America, in the European Union 
and among certain of its member countries, including Hungary. The article reviews the 
regulations and the developed practices in the fields of e-commerce, electronic invoices, 
electronic records management and certain e-government functions in Hungary which are 
necessary for digital communication. The work draws attention to the importance of secure 
keeping and processing of electronic documents, which is also enforced by the legal 
environment. The author points to the technical requirements and practical troubles of 
digital communication, called digital sustainability. 
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1 Introduction 
We may distinguish three revolutions in the development of written 
communication [1]. The first revolution was the invention of alphabetical writing 
carrying phonetic value around 1300 BC., which segregated the text from the 
content. The second revolution in the 15th Century was the book printing invented 
by Gutenberg, Johannes Gensfleisch, which made written material widely 
available. The third revolution – which is called the digital revolution – is 
currently going on. We cannot accurately define its nature without an historical 
overview, but we may declare that it has modified all of the essential structures of 
written communication. At the same time, however, it has kept all the 
achievements of the previous revolutions. This is the key to digital culture and to 
the information society. 
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With the development of digital communication, computers conquered space in 
the area of applications which traditionally used paper. We can consider records 
management, accountancy and generally the creation of the public documents, 
notary documents and simple contracts as those applications. The necessary 
technical conditions have existed since the 1990s, when the technology of 
encryption with an asymmetric key was worked out in detail, in addition to 
computer and network technologies. First this development made creating 
electronic signature possible, and then came the acceptance of defining the legal 
consequences. We may solve electronic authentication of documents by electronic 
signature in the international practice and in Hungarian legal requirements. In the 
European Union and in the Republic of Hungary there are at present political and 
legislative endeavours aimed at rapid development in these areas. The problems of 
this process are referred to as the issue of digital sustainability [2]. 
The basic question of this research is: What is the difference between conventional 
and digital communication, especially as regards the long-term storage and usage 
of electronic documents. The research question was analysed via observation, 
information gathering and empirical statements based on the personal professional 
practice of the author. 
2 Conditions of the Development of Digital 
Communication 
The technical requirements necessary for the development of digital 
communication can be divided into three parts: computer technology, networking 
technology and data security procedures, providing a practical equivalent to the 
requirements of traditional written communication. 
The first Turing-complete digital computer, the Zuse Z3, was constructed by Zuse 
Konrad in 1941. The creation of the transistor in 1947 revolutionized the world of 
crude electromechanical computers [3]. The integrated circuit, a mass of 
transistors fixed onto a single sheet, was developed in 1958. The first personal 
computer (the IBM PC) appeared in 1981, making it possible for home and office 
users to have computational performance. This was a huge invention compared to 
the usage of time slices in computer centres earlier. 
The development of computer networks started in 1962, when the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) set up a research team called the Intergalactic 
Network, a group of which developed the time-sharing system. This system made 
possible the sharing of a mainframe computers’ services between numerous users 
on a telex network [4]. 
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In 1969 a research team of ARPA created the first packet switched computer 
network, the ARPANET. This network connected only a couple of universities 
and military systems at that time. It was not until the end of the 1970s that the 
civilian and broad usage of the network was in sight, but already at this time rapid 
enlargement had started. ARPANET was interlinked with NSFNet during the late 
1980s, and the term ‘Internet’ was used as the name of the new network, which 
has since become the large and global TCP/IP network. 
According to the World Internet Project 2007, 49 percent of Hungarian 
households (about two million) owned a personal computer at home, and the third 
of these computers (35%) also had an internet connection [5]. 
There is another significant requirement – but one which generally receives lesser 
emphasis – in connection with the development of digital communication: human 
resources. This means inclination and ability of citizens and clients to use the 
developments in digital communication and to actively participation in the 
information society. Because of the limited nature of this paper, the human 
resources and the economical aspect are beyond its. 
In the following parts of the chapter, the development of the data security 
procedures and the legal-political conditions will be outlined, because of their 
emphasized significance in the present approach to the topic. 
2.1 Data Security Procedures 
The development and free public usage of data security procedures ensure a 
connection between the requirements of written communication and those of 
digital communication. It is necessary to ensure confidentiality, authenticity and 
originality in order to achieve the logic safety of electronic data. We accomplish 
this with mathematical methods, which cryptography (science of encryption) deals 
with. The encryption of information is practically the same age as writing, because 
since we started writing messages on paper (or on clay tablets) we have wanted 
others to be unable to read it. 
Modern cryptosystems are wholly based on mathematical encryption methods, 
made by computers, which were developed at the end of twentieth century. There 
are two kinds of encryption methods: symmetric and asymmetric. The primary 
difference between the two is that the same key is used for encryption and 
decryption in the case of the symmetric one (this method is called single key 
because of this), while we perform the encryption and decryption processes with 
two different keys in the case of the asymmetric one (the two key method). 
The modern computer-based symmetric encryption was developed in the 1970s. It 
applies reversible functions on blocks (generally 64-256 bits) by mixing and 
replacing characters or blocks of the clear text. In this method, it is possible to 
attain a good security level with the combination and numerous repeating of 
relatively simple procedures [6]. A popular symmetric cryptosystem of this kind is 
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the Data Encryption Standard (DES). While it is today insecure because of its 
short key length (56 bits), it is nevertheless occasionally used. As a result of break 
competitions on DES1 we can state that any confidential message encrypted by 
DES is breakable in minutes with the appropriate hardware. From the principle of 
symmetric encryption (in civilian use) the cyphertext is breakable in all cases; it 
depends only on time.2 Due to Kerckhoffs' principle, the security of encryption 
depends only on quality of the applied mathematical algorithm and the length of 
key, and thus not on the secrecy of the algorithm. Despite this, in individual cases, 
in the interest of increasing security (DES) or due to reasons of intellectual 
property (IDEA), the algorithm may be secret. Nowadays the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) is used more often than anything else. AES, 
developed in the 2000s, uses 128-256 bits of key length and is hopefully based on 
an appropriate algorithm. Nobody has yet found a weak point on it, and thus 
experiments show that AES would be breakable in millions of years with all 
computers in the world [7]. 
The other branch of modern cryptography is public or asymmetric key 
cryptography, developed in mid 1970s. This branch is based on mathematical 
problems of one way trap door functions: discrete logarithm, discrete square root, 
and factorization with very large prime factors [8]. The solution to these problems 
is simple with a certain secret (private key), while without the secret it is more 
complicated. The application of asymmetric systems requires a larger key (1024-
4096 bits) and more time for the coding and decoding processes, but the attained 
security is equal to that of the symmetric cryptosystems. For asymmetric 
encryption, it is necessary to generate two keys (a key pair) from a common 
secret. The common secret is destroyed after their generation. One of the key 
pairs’ members will be the cryptographic private key, which the owner must not 
let out of his possession under any circumstances. If this occurs after all, it is 
deemed compromised and it is not allowed to use the key pair any more. If 
possible, it is necessary to revoke it. The other member of the key pair is the 
public key, which can be published on the Internet, and it is allowed to be shared 
on any unsecure communication channels. The usage of the two keys is 
equivalent, and thus it is possible to encrypt with one key and decrypt with the 
other key. Thus the application of different directions becomes possible 
(encryption and electronic signature). 
The process of making an electronic signature is the following: you make a 
fingerprint from the data with a hash function. This function is a trap-door 
function, which means that the accomplishment of the function is simple in one 
direction, but in the other direction it is a complicated mathematical problem. This 
function generates a constant-size (128-512 bits) data set from the discretionary 
                                                          
1  see http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2108 
2  There is a theoretically unbreakable algorithm, One Time Pad, but its usage is not 
practical in civil environment, but it worths for military usage. 
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quantity of data. Changing one single bit in the input should modify at least 50 
percent of the output bits (avalanche effect). We call the data set received an 
output fingerprint, since it characterizes the input data in a unique way. It is 
impossible to restore the input from the output and it is almost impossible to find 
two inputs with the same output.3 In practice SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, and 
Whirlpool algorithms are used. MD5 was suspected of being unsafe for years and 
its algorithm was broken in December 2008, and since that time its usage has been 
unsafe [9]. After the execution of this process on the document we have to sign, 
we encrypt the fingerprint with the cryptographic private key. We receive the 
electronic signature as a separate file which is independent from the document. 
We may send the signed document and the signature together to the addressee on a 
public channel, for example by e-mail. The addressee decrypts the electronic 
signature with our public key and obtains the fingerprint that we made. During this 
time he or she makes a fingerprint from the document we have sent with the same 
hash function and compares them. If they are the same, we can claim with 
certainty that no changes have occurred in the signed document, and that the 
signature on the document was made by the pair of our public key. On the other 
hand, it does not prove that this private key actually belongs to the sender, or that 
it has not been revoked, and we cannot ascertain the time of the signing. These 
criteria have to be proved by additional functions and controls. We may solve the 
problem of authenticity by binding the keys to one person, using two methods: 
with the web of trust (WoT) method [10], used by Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). 
According to this method, individuals trusting each other sign each other’s keys. If 
the addressee trusts any of the persons signing the sender’s key, or can follow 
back the signatures to a reliable person, this assures the sender's authenticity. The 
disadvantage of this method is that vast confidential networks are necessary in 
which two unknown people may have common acquaintances. The other method 
is Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In this method, a third party who is entrusted 
by all communicating parties attests the reliability of all customers. This occurs 
with the use of a certificate, which is an electronic data set, and implies the public 
key. The third party is entrusted by the state or the public, who verifies the owner 
of the key and the key's relation prior to issuing the certificate (for example with 
the request of an ID or a verification e-mail). If the Certification Authority (CA), 
which is the national root, is trusted, other elements of the path are automatically 
entrusted. The publicly entrusted entity is called Certification Service Provider 
(CSP).4 The Timestamping Authority (TSA), who electronically signs the accurate 
time that the sender builds into the electronic signature of the document, does the 
authentication statement of the time of the electronic signature. A request for a 
timestamp generally happens on-line through the internet. The trustworthiness of 
the TSA is proven by its certificate issued by a trusted CA. The usage of key pairs, 
or rather the certificates, can be limited. A key pair can be used for an electronic 
                                                          
3  weakly or strongly collision free security, see [8] 
4  CSP and CA are often used in same sense 
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signature, encryption, authentication or certificate issuance (such as CA). If we 
want to use more functions from among these but the certificate is restricted, we 
will need more key pairs and certificates. 
The outlined technology has been developed to be suitable for the service of 
trusted digital communication. This fact alone is not sufficient for reaching this 
aim without considering other aspects. 
2.2 Regulations and Practice 
After the algorithmic and technical infrastructural realisation of the electronic 
signature, it was necessary to actualize practical usage in order for legislators to 
allow paper-based signatures to be replaced with electronic signatures. Utah, in 
the U.S., in early 1995 was the first state to pass a digital signature act. In Europe, 
Germany was the first country that accepted electronic signatures in 1996 (Gesetz 
zur digitalen Signatur), followed by the United Kingdom in 1999 (Building 
Confidence in Electronic Commerce – A Consolidation Document) and the 
European Union in 1999 (Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 13 December 1999 on Community framework for electronic 
signatures). 
The first step in Hungarian legislation was Act XXXV of 2001 on Electronic 
Signatures [11].5 Electronic governmental services started partly on the basis of 
this rule of law. Electronic tax returns became available from the end of the 
nineties in several phases, and this improved considerably in 2002 and 2006 [12]. 
The electronic data-supplier service of the land registry (TakarNet) started in 
2003, client gate (detailed later) began in 2005, regulations on electronic records 
management have existed since 2006, electronic public procurement started in 
2007, electronic company registration was launched in 2008, as was the electronic 
auction of revenue authority and the change of Act on Accounting to simplify the 
storage of electronic invoices. 
The Hungarian electronic signature law – corresponding to Directive 1999/93/EC 
– distinguishes three levels of electronic signatures independent from the technical 
background. At the bottom level there is the ‘simple’ electronic signature, which 
means a name written down into the electronic documents without any safety 
requirement (for example the signature at the end of an email). The legislator does 
not bind any special legal consequence to it, but only makes its acceptance subject 
to free consideration. The second safety level is the advanced electronic signature, 
which has to meet the requirements for the capability of identifying the signatory, 
uniquely linked to the signatory, which is created using devices that the signatory 
can maintain under his sole control; and it is linked to the document to which it 
relates in such a manner that any change to the data of the document made 
                                                          
5  abbreviated as ‘Eat.’ 
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subsequent to the execution of the signature is detectable.6 The binding legal 
consequence is the correspondence to the legal requirements to put into written 
form excluding several specified fields.7 From among the electronic signatures, 
the safest one that meets the highest requirements is the qualified electronic 
signature. The qualified electronic signature is an advanced electronic signature, 
which is created with a secure signature creation device (SSCD) and which comes 
with a certificate issued with it.8 The requirements for qualified certificates are the 
strictest and these certificates are subject to additional regulation. An electronic 
document supplied with a qualified electronic signature is a full, conclusive 
private agreement. Thus, its authenticity and the fact of its belonging to the signer 
cannot be disputed until proof to the contrary. In the case of the last two levels, an 
independent audit and authority supervision is compulsory for the operation of 
Certification Service Providers and the production of certificates. The audit is 
carried out by independent audit companies (currently two) designated by the 
minister responsible for informatics and supervised by National Communication 
Authority. The security and quality of electronic signature and certification 
services in Hungary is ensured by these controls. Presently four Certificate Service 
Providers are operating in the Republic of Hungary. 
Several non-PKI-based identification systems are used in Hungarian e-government 
applications, such as a smartcard solution in tax revenue procedures between 2004 
and 2006 and ‘Client Gate’ from 2005. ‘Client Gate’ is a web-based online 
authentication system operated by Senior State Secretariat for Informatics. 
Registration occurs in local administrative offices with an identity-check; later 
several governmental services are accessible via this portal after SSL username 
and password authentication. 
3 Problems of Digital Sustainability 
The long-term preservation of electronic documents, especially of the 
electronically signed ones, is a complex task. The electronic data and its physical 
form must be protected from destruction. It is necessary to solve the long-term 
probative value of the electronic signature by the storage of its certification path, 
and it is also necessary to ensure access to the application capable of opening the 
given document. 
The long-term preservation of the soundness of electronic data is aggregate 
combination of physical, logical and operational safety tasks [13]. In all cases, the 
redundancy of the data storage system and safe long-term storage of data storage 
devices is necessary. 
                                                          
6  Eat. 2. § 15. 
7  Eat. 3. § (2-3) family law and judicial proceedings, unless the law explicitly allows 
8  Eat. 2. § 17. 
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3.1 Excessive Velocity 
The Hungarian government is struggling to move citizens’ and other clients’ 
paper-based activities to electronic procedures. This means in the long term, in 
practice, the creation and usage of electronic documents exclusive. This endeavour 
seems an exaggerated foreshadowing process in certain cases. 
Legislators have not provided time for the conversion from paper-based processes 
to electronic ones. For example, the electronic tax return, electronic records 
management and the electronic firm registration happened this way. The majority 
of companies had less than one year to switch to the electronic tax return in the 
firm registration procedure; some companies had only half a year. There was no 
possibility for lawyers to register companies without adopting new technologies 
and knowledge [14]. We can consider this as switching to digital communication 
from the traditional written communication. We practiced the traditional 
communication for several thousand years, yet the number of illiterate people is 
one hundred thousand in Hungary [15]; therefore, a paradigm shift of this scale 
seems hopeless in several years. Well-developed countries, which have already 
introduced these steps towards digital communication maintain the opportunity to 
use paper-based documents. For example, in Austria the electronic firm 
registration procedure was available in the 80s with computers via the telephone 
network, a considerable part of public and criminal procedures became electronic 
in 90s, and a refining of the informatics opportunities for payment became 
available in this decade. Despite this intense and continuous development, the 
clients still have the opportunity to use paper-based documents in the above 
procedures, which he or she can download from the website of the Ministry of 
Justice. 
3.2 Diversity of Formats 
The variety of formats and the resulting diversity of processes and differences of 
applications have caused considerable difficulties until now and probably will 
cause them later as well. The well-known and more or less widely used electronic 
document file formats are the plain text file (txt), Microsoft Rich Text Format 
(RTF), and the Portable Document Format (PDF). Currently in Hungary TXT, 
RTF 1.7, PDF 1.3 formats fall under interpretational obligation by authorities in 
electronic administrative procedures [16]. The primary disadvantage of these 
formats is that these are unstructured; therefore, these can only clumsily be 
processed in automatic systems. The Microsoft Word document (DOC) is more 
widely used, but it is a licensed, proprietary format; its precise construction is 
Microsoft's trade secret. This has made it impossible for any other companies’ 
software to be fully compatibility with it. To correct these generation faults both 
developer sides (Microsoft and OpenDocument Foundation) made new formats 
based on XML. Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a general aim descriptor 
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language, with the goal of the formation of special descriptor languages. XML, 
which is an improvement on the SGML language standardized by ISO in 1986 
[17], became a W3C recommendation in 1998 [18]. The aim of XML is to 
structure data. It is licence-free, platform-independent and widely supported. An 
XML document is valid if it is well-formed (suits for the syntax of the XML 
language) and it matches a defined content rule, which defines the accepted value 
types and value places. This definition of the rules can be done with Document 
Type Definition (DTD) or XML Schema Definition (XSD). The OpenDocument 
format (ODF) developed by OpenDocument Foundation [19] and Office Open 
XML (OOXML) developed by Microsoft [20] are based on this technological 
framework. These formats may become the widely used future document formats. 
The forms possess unique XSD with severe bindings based on this technology and 
can be automatically processed. 
The general and the records management metadata problems are professionally 
particular, but in administrative informatics there are considerable questions. 
These are about in what kind of form, value and entity the metadata (data about 
data) appears. Many initiatives have been initiated to try to resolve this issue: the 
Dublin Core Metadata Initiative (DCMI), Managing Information Resources for e-
Government (MIREG), GovML and PSI Application Profile [21]. 
A foreign country example for the format problem is that it was not possible to 
restore the measurement data of the Viking space probe stored on magnetic tape in 
1976. It was necessary to type in everything again from the earlier printed 
documents because the stored format was unknown. 
3.3 On-Line Data Security 
If we store the electronic data in a working computer system on-line, it is 
necessary to protect the system physically against disaster losses (fire, water 
damage, even by the public utility drinking water supply or drainage, earthquake, 
the destruction of the object due to other reasons); against incidents due to a 
deficiency of technical requirements (deficiency of power supply, power supply 
disturbances, the deterioration of climatic circumstances (which may be 
temperature or humidity problem), informatics network problems)); against 
electromagnetic disturbances (even in case of intentional damage); and against 
technical reliability problems (production mistakes, fatigue, other breakdowns). 
The logic safety covers the reliability of software elements (the operating system, 
applications), protection against intentional damage (viruses, worms, malicious 
programs, network attacks, and hacker activity), the security of network protocols, 
setting rights, identity management and access management. [22] The reliability of 
software components could be enhanced by defensive programming techniques, 
with mitigating risks like data leakage vulnerability. [23] 
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3.4 Offline Data Security 
The storage of the digital data can be done on optical or magnetic media if the data 
does not change, and this solution seems to be more beneficial in terms of 
expenses. The primary medium of optical data storage is the DVD nowadays. This 
is not an eternal data storage solution, contrary to public belief. Depending on the 
quality of the disk we may be confident of the survival of the data up to at most 10 
years, but based on the author’s own experience, the data can be lost from the disk 
even after two years. Arising from this, it follows that in the case of optical data 
storage use, periodic regeneration is inevitable, which in practical terms means 
copying the discs. The benefit of the optical data storage is the insensitivity to 
electromagnetic fields, but it is necessary to maintain the suitable temperature, 
humidity and mechanics at the time of storage. The other widely used data storage 
is magnetic tape, which has a longer history than optical drives. The capacity of 
magnetic tape storage still exceeds the capacity of the optical; a cassette tape can 
have one Terabyte capacity.9 Over all of requirements of optical storage, the 
requirement of protection against electromagnetic interference (EMI) also appears. 
Regular regeneration of the media is necessary because the magnetic carrier 
demagnetises over time. 
Those who store or archive data must provide the necessary environment for the 
opening of electronic documents, but users and operators are inclined to forget this 
requirement, despite its particularly large significance. Presupposing the worst 
case, imagine we have to open a stored electronic document 100 years later. The 
word processor application was made by a software-developing firm working in a 
garage in 1992. The format of the document does not comply with any kind of 
standards, and the full computer architecture has changed, but legal regulations do 
not allow the document to be destroyed. In this naturally strongly polarized 
example we have to store the archived document, the application able to open the 
document, the operating system capable of running the application and the full 
hardware configuration capable of running the operating system. The 
simplification of this procedure can be done by the emulation of a system capable 
of all of the above or a special realisation of the emulation and the migration 
called Universal Virtual Computer (UVC) [24]. This problem arose already at the 
time of the research of the state security documents after the political 
transformation in Hungary, when the researchers were unable to read important 
documents stored on magnetic tapes, because the proper reader could not be 
obtained or reproduced.10 Of course the interest in keeping this information secret 
may be playing a part in this issue. 
                                                          
9  see http://www.ibm.com/systems/storage/tape/ 
10  Based on the oral information of Dr. Trócsányi Sára, head of department of Office of 
Data Protection and Freedom of Information Commissioner, Hungary, Pécs, 
November 15, 2008. 
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As a mixed on-line and off-line data security solution for general documents, 
records and book digital libraries can be used as a part of conventional libraries 
[25]. This solution has been under research for a decade in the Western countries, 
but is not well known in Central and Eastern Europe. 
3.5 Authenticity of an Electronic Signature 
The validity of the electronic signature is provable after a couple of hours or days. 
The reason of this is that in order to check the validity, we toned to know the 
current certificate revocation list (CRL) of the CA at the time of the signature, in 
which the certificate service provider publishes the certificates revoked due to 
being compromised or to something else. This time can significantly be reduced 
with the use of Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). After this procedure, 
the authenticity of the electronic signature is continuously provable, if the 
revocation lists and the full certification path is accessible. The electronic 
archiving activity receives a role here: at the moment of archiving, the valid 
authentication data is stored and re-authenticated by the electronic archiving 
service provider. Thus the authenticity of an electronic document signed by the 
archiving service provider depends only on the existence of the electronic 
archiving service provider, but is not influenced by the falling out of a part of the 
certification path, for example by the terminating of CA activity or the 
compromise of the CA key. This is the point where the electronic archiving 
service provider's activity rises above the issue of the simple safe data storage. 
Conclusions 
It follows from the previously expounded manifold requirements and problems 
that during storage and processing of electronic documents, an organization faces 
serious difficulties. The risk stemming from the outlined problems is diverging in 
different countries. The faster that digital communication develops, the harder it is 
to find time to solve problems. Therefore the chance of a later escalating of 
troubles increases. 
The rapid development of administrative informatics in Central and Eastern 
European countries belongs to this category [26]. In to the author's opinion, these 
countries did not analyse well enough the 30 years of experience of Western 
European states in this field, even though avoiding same mistakes would be 
possible that way. These undiscovered problems may cause serious data loss in the 
government sector. 
Digital preservation deals with the dangers stemming from the above-mentioned 
problems and with the protection against them. The hypothesis of an apocalyptic 
future because of all the above is called the digital dark age [27]. According to this 
theory, most of the electronic documents made in the 21st Century will disappear 
with just a few written memories remaining, similar to the Middle Ages. Leading 
representatives of this theory are the Getty Research Institute researchers [28], and 
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Kuny, Terry [29]. However, a refutation was also born which states that the 
experiences until now are only examples of deficiencies in data restoration, not in 
data loss [30]. As a comprehensive solution to the technical problems, an ISO 
reference model was made called Open Archival Information System (OAIS) [31]. 
Against the excessive speed, better policymaking may provide protection in 
Hungary; for the format problem and partially data security problem, stricter 
regulation may provide protection. The efficient handler of the electronic 
signature and the partially data security problems should be the electronic 
archiving service providers working on the market. Certainly, because the 
complexity of these problems and the deficiency of the market, many claim there 
is no electronic archiving service provider working well (in a suitable measure 
used) in Hungary. On the other hand, the organisations obliged to preserve 
electronic documents reckon that they are able to do justice to these requirements 
with their own infrastructure and human resources. Based on the author's own 
experience the village local governments with ten employees also think that they 
will be able to satisfy this task on their own, but it does not seem so in the long 
run. 
As a problem statement for further research we could find out the exact specialties 
of digital sustainability in Central and Eastern Europe and make recommendations 
on reducing the gap between WEU and CEE states. 
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